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ANTITRUST STATE ACTION DEFENSE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE HOME
RULE MUNICIPALITIES
Community Communications Company v. City of Boulder,
[1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,362 (10th Cir.)
In Community Communications Company v. City of Boulder' the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded state action immunity to en-
compass Colorado home rule municipalities2 exercising a governmen-
tal function?
The plaintiff, holder of a non-exclusive permit from defendant to
provide cable television service to the city, planned to extend services to
the entire city.4 The city, fearing a complete cessation of competition in
the Boulder market, issued ordinances that placed a ninety-day mora-
torium on expansion by plaintiff5 and solicited competition for plaintiff
by circulating a model ordinance among other cable television compa-
nies in the United States.6 The plaintiff moved for a preliminary in-
junction, arguing that the ordinances were a restraint of trade and thus
a violation of the Sherman Act.' The defendant argued that the ordi-
nances were a valid exercise of police powers and immune from the
1. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,362 (10th Cir.).
2. The term "municipality" includes corporations, towns, and cities, but not counties. I E.
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.20 (3d ed. 1971).
3. See note 49 infra.
4. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, [1980-2] Trade Cas. 63,362, at
75,841 (10th Cir.). When plaintiff planned expansion of services, it was only serving 20% of the
Boulder market, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1036 (D.
Colo. 1980), or approximately 1,500 subscribers, Amicus Curiae Brief of the Colorado Attorney
General at 5, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,362 (10th Cir.).
5. See Boulder, Colo., Ordinances 4472 & 4473 (December 18, 1979, and January 1, 1980,
respectively). Ordinance No. 4472 revoked a 1964 ordinance under which plaintiff was operating
and re-enacted it to include a restriction on plaintiffs expansion of services for three months.
Ordinance 4473 amended the 1964 ordinance to include the same three month restriction. Both
ordinances stated that their purpose was to allow other cable television companies to bid to pro-
vide services to the city. 485 F. Supp. at 1037.
6. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, [1980-21 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,362, at 75,841 (10th Cir.). The model ordinance, distributed to more than fifty cable television
companies in the United States, expressly stated that the purpose of the ordinance was to solicit
competition for the Boulder market. A letter accompanying the ordinance, however, stressed that
the city had not yet adopted the ordinance. Brief of Appellant City of Boulder at 8, Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 63,362 (10th Cir.).
7. Id at 75,841. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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antitrust laws under the state action exemption.' The trial court found
that the city was not immune from antitrust liability9 and granted the
injunction.10 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
remanded, and held: Antitrust immunity extends to Colorado home
rule municipalities exercising governmental functions if the municipal-
ity establishes that the alleged anticompetitive activity is; (1) specifi-
cally directed by the state in furtherance of state policy, and (2)
supervised by the state."t
The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890 to stimulate competition, prohib-
its unreasonable restraints of trade and monopolization.' 2 One of the
few judicially created exemptions to the Sherman Act is the state action
exemption, which absolves sovereign actions of a state or its political
subdivisions from antitrust liability. t3 Although the principle underly-
ing the state action exemption emerged shortly after passage of the
Act,' 4 courts did not completely accept the doctrine until Parker v.
8. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (D.
Colo. 1980).
9. See id. at 1039.
10. Id at 1041.
11. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,362, at 75,844 (10th Cir.).
12. Sherman Act § 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a fel-
ony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Sherman Act § 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if
a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id at § 2. See generally R. SHERMAN, ANTITRUST POLICIES AND ISSUES 33-38 (1978); J. VAN
CISE, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 7-9 (3d rev. ed. 1975).
13. In contrast to the few judicially created exemptions, there are numerous statutory exemp-
tions. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1976) (exempting agricultural cooperatives); 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1976) (exempting labor, horticultural, and agricultural associations); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (ex-
empting SEC, CAB, ICC, FPC, and FCC approved transactions); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1976)
(exempting state supervision of resale prices); 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976) (exempting export trade as-
sociations); 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976) (exempting state regulation of insurance companies).
14. The principle was suggested but not fully explored in Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (4th
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/13
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Brown 5 in 1943.
In Parker the Supreme Court held that a state statute' 6 authorizing a
marketing program," which allegedly restrained competition,", was
not within the intended scope of the Sherman Act.'9 The Court ex-
amined the legislative history of the Sherman Act and concluded that
the Act prohibited "business combinations,"20 but not official acts of
government undertaken by a state in its sovereign capacity.2 ' Chief
Justice Stone, writing for the majority, provided three rationales for the
decision to exempt state action. First, although a state is a "person" for
some purposes under the Act,2 z the Act neither mentions the state nor
Cir. 1895). The court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to a state's monopolization of
traffic in liquor because the state is neither a "person" nor "corporation" within the Act. Id at
911. The Supreme Court expanded the principle in Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), stating
that if the state has authority to regulate an activity, no monopoly or combination results when the
state excludes all but state agents from participating in that activity. Id at 345; see note 25 infra.
15. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
16. California Agricultural Prorate Act, ch. 754, 1933 Cal. Stats. 1969, as amended by chs.
471 and 473, 1935 Cal. Stats; ch. 6 Extra Session, 1938; chs. 363, 548, and 894, 1939 Cal. Stats; and
chs. 603, 1150, and 1186, 1941 Cal. Stats.
17. The California Agricultural Prorate Act authorized establishment of an agricultural mar-
keting program that restricted the amount of raisins a producer could market. See Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 344-50 (1943).
18. The Supreme Court assumed that "the California prorate program would violate the
Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by virtue of a contract, combination or
conspiracy of private persons, individual or corporate." Id at 350.
19. Id at 352.
20. Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula/or Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69
Nw. U.L. REv. 71 (1974), criticized the Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act:
The Court's contention that Senator Sherman declared the bill to prevent only "busi-
ness combinations" is a quotation taken out of context. What Senator Sherman actually
said was:
It [the act] does not interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary associations made
to affect public opinion to advance the interests of a particular trade or occupation ...
They are not business combinations. They do not deal with contracts, agreements, etc.
Id at 83 (quoting Senator Sherman from 21 CONG. RE C. 2562 (1890)). But see American Column
& Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); Note, Antitrust Law-GovernmentalAction Immunity-Should State Presence
Alone Be Sufficient to Justfy the Exemption?, 26 MERCER L. REv. 995, 996 (1975). See also Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,493 (1940); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.
271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898), modAed, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
21. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
22. One year before Parker, the Supreme Court held that a state is a "person" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act. See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1942). Cf. United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941) (United States not a "person" within meaning of
Sherman Act). More importantly, the Supreme Court has held that a city is a "person" for pur-
poses of the Sherman Act. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S.
390, 396 (1906).
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gives any indication that it applies to state actions.23 Second, actions of
the state or its political subdivisions are not "business combinations. 24
Finally, principles of federalism demand preservation of state sover-
eignty. The Court, in the absence of clear congressional intent to dis-
place state regulatory schemes, cannot infer legislative intent.25 The
state, however, can neither have "blanket immunity," nor can it delib-
erately shield private parties from antitrust liability.26 Although the
Court did not address the application of the "state action" exemption
to municipalities, it suggested that a municipality is the equivalent of
an agent of the state.27 The precedential value of Parker remained un-
clear, however, because the Court failed to establish guidelines to aid
courts in determining when to apply the exemption.28
23. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
24. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
25. See 317 U.S. at 351. The Court commented: "In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally sub-
tract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and
agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." Id
26. Id The Court commented: "True, a state does not give immunity to those who violate
the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." Id
(citing Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-47 (1904)).
27. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
28. This failure to provide clear guidelines caused a split in the lower courts. Compare City
of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded mem., 435
U.S. 992 (1978) (county hospital association required by state agency to lease hospital from county
industrial development authority not exempt); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded mem. sub noma. City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978) (town
zoning ordinance prohibiting sale of alcohol in residential zones not exempt); Kurek v. Pleasure
Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded menm, 435 U.S. 992
(1978) (city park commission demand for uniform increase in concession fees at all municipal golf
course concessions not exempt); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) (city ban on
sale of malt beverage, manufactured by plaintiff, in public facilities not exempt); Allegheny
Uniforms v. Howard Uniform Co., 384 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (State Port Authority denial
to plaintiff of approval to sell uniforms to Port Authority employees not exempt) and Azarro v.
Town of Branford, [1974-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 75,337 (D. Conn.) (town purchase of insurance
from select companies and boycott of all other companies not exempt) with Metro Cable Co. v.
CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975) (city council grant of cable television
franchise to defendant and refusing franchise to plaintiff exempt); New Mexico v. American Pe-
trofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974) (state and its political subdivisions conspiracy to fix
prices on asphalt exempt); Saenz v. University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.
1973) (state agency determination that slide rule manufactured by plaintiff not within require-
ments of state and consequent ban of plaintiffs slide rule from interscholastic competition ex-
empt); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966) (state agency operation of airport with one fixed base operator and
consequent exclusion of plaintiff exempt); Continental Bus. Sys., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F.
Supp. 359 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (city grant of exclusive franchise to pick up passengers at airport to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/13
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Thirty-two years after Parker,29 the Supreme Court began to narrow
the scope of the state action immunity doctrine. In Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar30 the Court declared that action merely authorized by the
state3' was outside the state action exemption. 2 The state, acting in its
sovereign capacity, must compel a state agency to engage in anticompe-
titive activities to apply the Parker exemption.3 In 1977 the Court in
Bates v. State Bar of 4rizona34 expressly affirmed the compulsion re-
city owned bus system and consequent exclusion of private bus lines exempt) and Trans World
Assocs. v. City & County of Denver, [1974-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 75,293 (D. Colo.) (city limit on
number of car rental concessions at airport and consequent exclusion of plaintiff exempt). See
generally Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus,4nticompetive State Regulation, 39 ANTITRUST
L.J. 950 (1970); Jacobs, State Regulation andthe FederalAntitrust Laws, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
221 (1975); Posner, The Proper Relationshp Between State Regulation and FederalAntitrust Laws,
49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1974); Tepley, Antitrust Immunity ofState andLocal GovernmentalAction,
48 TUL. L. REV. 272 (1974); White, Partipant GovernmentalAction Immunity From the Antitrust
Laws.- Fact or Fiction?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 474 (1972); Note, FederalAntitrust Liability and the State
Administrative Official, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 405 (1976); Note, The Antitrust Liabillty of Munidvali-
ties Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REV. 368 (1977); Note, An Application of the Federal
Antitrust Laws to a State Authority, 43 B.U.L. REV. 541 (1963); Note, Antitrust Law and Municial
Corporations Are Municipalities Exempt From Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doc-
trine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547 (1977); Note, The StateAction Antitrust Exemption: The Confinement of
the Parker Doctrine Within the Emerging Cantor Formula, 29 HASTINOs L.J. 211 (1977); Note,
Antitrust Law-Governmental4ction Immunity-Should State Presence.41one Be Sufficient to Justify
the Exemption, 26 MERCER L. REV. 995 (1975); Note, Government Action andAntitrust Immunity,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1971).
29. The Supreme Court did not review a lower court's ruling on the state action exemption
from 1943 to 1975.
30. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
31. The defendant argued that its actions were "prompted" by a state agency. The Court
found defendant's argument inconclusive and, consequently, inspected the Virginia statutes to
determine if defendant's activities were required by state law. Finding no state law behind de-
fendant's activities, the Court ruled that a mere "prompting" was insufficient to satisfy the dictates
of the Parker doctrine. Id at 790-91.
32. Id at 791.
33. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state supreme court disciplinary rule
prohibiting advertisements by attorneys held a sufficiently articulated prohibition to compel com-
pliance); Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974) (state
legislative mandate charging instrumentality with authority to operate airport held sufficient com-
pulsion to establish monopoly taxi service); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433
F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970) (statutory provisions enacting compact between adjacent states for crea-
tion of transporation agency held sufficient compulsion to establish monopoly bus service); E.W.
Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
947 (1966) (state legislative mandate charging instrumentality with authority to operate airport
held sufficient compulsion to establish monopoly fixed base operations); Asheville Tobacco Bd. of
Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959) (statutory provisions creating local tobacco board
with authority to regulate sales of tobacco held sufficient compulsion to establish selling time
allotted to tobacco warehouses).
34. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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quirement. Anticompetitive activities are exempt from the antitrust
laws when they are part of a state policy, which is clearly expressed and
supervised by the state.35 If the state's directives are permissive, rather
than compulsory, then the state's policy is neutral and no immunity
attaches to the anticompetitive activities.36 Furthermore, if an exemp-
tion is not necessary to the successful functioning of the state's regula-
tory policy, then there is no immunity.37
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.38 a sharply di-
vided Court rejected a claim that municipalities are sovereign and thus
exempt from the antitrust laws.39 The Court found that municipalities
are agents of the state and merely reflect state policy.40 Municipalities
35. Id at 362.
36. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d
25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263
F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959); Princeton Community Phonebook v. Bate, [1978-2] Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,138 (3d Cir.); United States v. Texas State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 464 F. Supp. 400 (W.D.
Tex. 1978) (per curiam), affl'dmen., 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925 (1979); Star
Lines Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., [1978-i1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,027
(S.D.N.Y.). See also Cedar-Riverside Assocs. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn.
1978). aff'd, 606 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979).
37. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). The Court stated: "The Court
has consistently refused to find that regulation gave rise to an implied exemption without first
determining that exemption was necessary in order to make the regulatory Act work, 'and even
then only to the minimum extent necessary.'" Id at 597 (quoting Justice Goldberg in Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)). See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350 (1977); United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Bordon Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939);
Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497 (1936). But cf. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
Virginia State Bar, [1977-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,406 (E.D. Va.) (Virginia State Bar practice of
issuing advisory opinions resulting in illegal restraint of trade beyond scope of authorization by
Supreme Court).
38. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
39. Id at 412. The Court insisted that states were superior to municipalities within the fed-
eral system. "Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of
the States that create them." Id See, eg., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974);
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). See generally Bangasser, Exposure of Municipal
Corporations to Liabilityfor Violations of the Antitrust Laws: Antitrust Immunity after the City of
Lafayette Decision, 11 UuB. LAW. vii (1979); Note, The Application of 4ntitrust Laws to Municipal
Activities, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 518 (1979); Comment, MunicialAntitrust Liability: City of Lafay-
ette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 18 UB. L. ANN. 265 (1980).
40. See 435 U.S. at 413. See, e.g., Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287
(1883). Accord, Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970); E.W.
Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/13
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may exercise only those powers that the state grants them.4' A munici-
pality, like a state, cannot claim automatic immunity.42 To qualify for
immunity, the municipality must show that the state legislature in-
tended to displace competition through the alleged anticompetitive ac-
tivity.43 If the intent is unclear, the courts can infer intent44 from the
degree of state supervision,45 the purpose of the legislation,46 or the
legislative history of the act.47 If the court finds no intent to displace
anticompetitive activity, then the state policy is neutral. 48 Only Chief
Justice Burger distinguished between a municipality's governmental
947 (1966); Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083, 1092 (M.D. Fla. 1973). See also
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
Municipalities, however, are not mere instrumentalities of the state because they have autono-
mous power, granted by the state, to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of their citi-
zens. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 383-89 (1926); Hadacheck v.
City of Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 413-14 (1915); Barnes v. Merritt, 428 F.2d 284, 287 (5th Cir.
1970) (dictum). See generally Note, Antitrust Law and Municpal Corporations.- Are Municivalities
Exempt From Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547, 1559 (1977).
A state may exercise only limited power over a municipality. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960) (state attempt to fix boundaries of municipality to exclude black voters forbidden
by fifteenth amendment); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320 (1958) (state attempt to
block construction of dam by municipality forbidden as waters within dominion of the United
States); City of Davenport v. Three-fifths of an Acre of Land, 252 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1958) (state
opposition to congressional authorization of city's condemnation of state owned land barred by
eleventh amendment).
41. See, e.g., City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24 Iowa 455 (1868); 1 J.
DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911); Van-
landingham, Local Governmental Immunity Re-Examined, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 237 (1966).
42. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See note 28 supra
and accompanying text.
43. 435 U.S. at 413. The Court cited the Bates test as appropriate to determine liability in
this situation. Id at 410.
44. Id at 415. The Court stated: "This does not mean however, that a political subdivision
necessarily must be able to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization before it properly
may assert a Parker defense to an antitrust suit." Id
45. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Bangasser, supra
note 39, at vii, xxv (1979).
46. See, e.g., Mobilfone of Northeastern Pa. Inc. v. Commonwealth Tel. Co., 428 F. Supp.
131 (E.D. Pa. 1977), af'd, [1978-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,873 (3d Cir.); BANOASSER, supra note
39, at vii, xxv.
47. See, e.g., Bangasser, supra note 39, at vii, xxiv-xxv (1979). Bangasser notes that most
states do not keep records of legislative debates.
48. 435 U.S. at 414. See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 477 F.
Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1978); Interconnect Planning Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 465 F.
Supp. 811, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Star Lines Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 451 F.
Supp. 157, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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and proprietary functions.49
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc. S0 the Supreme Court held that a state agency that issues anticom-
petitive regulations must meet the requirements of the two step test
5
'
announced in City of Lafayette and Bates. 2 First, the state legislature
must expressly declare that the challenged activity is performed with
regard to state policy. 3 Second, the state itself must supervise the
workings of the policy.54 The MidcalAluminum Court also did not dis-
tinguish between governmental and proprietary activities. 5 The Court
stated that the two step test was appropriate for determining antitrust
immunity under Parker,56 implying that the test was applicable
whether the municipality's activity was governmental or proprietary.
Home rule municipalities are a particularly difficult problem for the
49. Id at 422 (Burger, C.J., concurring with opinion in Part I and in the judgment).
A municipality may exercise either governmental or proprietary functions. Note, The Antitrust
Liability of Municpalities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REv. 368, 378 (1977); Note, Anti-
trust Law and Municipal Corporations. Are Municpalities Exempt From Sherman Act Coverage
Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547, 1557 (1977). Governmental functions are "those
undertaken as administrative subdivisions of the state entrusted with the execution of a broad
range of express and implied powers." 57 B.U.L. REV. at 378. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey,
262 U.S. 182, 185-87 (1923); City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1254 n.51 (5th Cir.
1976). Proprietary functions are "those activities that are quasi-private in nature and that are
performed primarily for the benefit of the residents or for the private benefit of the municipality
itself." Note, The Antitrust Liability of Municipalities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REv.
368, 378 (1977).
50. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
51. Id at 105.
52. Id See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
53. See 445 U.S. at 105. See also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); United States v. Texas State Bd. of
Pub. Accountancy, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925 (1979); Crocker v. Padnos,
483 F. Supp. 229, 232 (D. Mass. 1980); Caribe Trailor Systems, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Maritime
Shipping Auth., 475 F. Supp. 711, 721 (D.D.C. 1979); City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power
Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1347 (N.D. Ind. 1979), affd inpart and vacated in part, 616 F.2d 976 (7th
Cir. 1980).
54. See 445 U.S. at 105. See also New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96
(1978); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Allstate Beer, Inc. v. Julius Wile Sons & Co., 479 F. Supp. 605 (N.D.
Ga. 1979); Beckenstein v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 479 F. Supp. 417 (D. Conn. 1979); Huron
Valley Hosp. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
55. See 445 U.S. at 104-06. See note 49 supra.
56. 445 U.S. at 105.
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courts. 7 The majority of states5 8 have enacted either statutory or con-
stitutional home rule charters5 9 that allow municipalities to regulate lo-
cal matters.6 0  They do not, however, grant complete autonomy to
municipalities.6' Home rule municipalities remain subservient to state
57. Compare In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Cal.
1979) (home rule charter did not mandate city to monopolize airport car rental market) and
Woolen v. Surtan Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (home rule charter did not
mandate city to monopolize airport taxicab market) with Glenwillow Landfill v. City of Akron,
485 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (home rule charter did mandate city to regulate competition in
solid waste disposal).
A comparison of lower court decisions on home rule is difficult because the courts deal with
different kinds of home rule charters. See note 58 infra. The quantity and type of power, which a
particular home rule charter confers on a municipality, will greatly influence a court's deference to
the municipality. See generally 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 4.83, 10.09-.14
(3d ed. 1971); S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 216-25 (1970);
Bangasser, supra note 39, at vii; Vanlandingham, Munioal Home Rule in the United States, 10
WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1968); Note, The Antitrust Liability of Munlcoalities Under the Parker
Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REV. 368 (1977); Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to MunicvalActirl.
ties, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 518 (1979).
In Colorado the state courts often interpreted various provisions of that state's home rule char-
ter. See Public Util. Comm'n v. City of Durango, 171 Colo. 553, 469 P.2d 131 (1970); City &
County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958); City & County of Denver v.
McNichols, 129 Colo. 251, 268 P.2d 1026 (1954).
58. Vanlandingham, supra note 57, at 277. Vanlandingham commented that by 1966 thirty-
three states had enacted some form of home rule charter. Id
59. Although a state's enactment of a home rule charter is either statutory or constitutional,
home rule charters are generally classified into three types: self-executing, mandatory, and per-
missive. A self-executing charter grants a city the authority to implement power without relying
on state legislative action. A mandatory charter, characterized by inclusion of the term "shall,"
permits a state legislature to enact legislation to implement home rule powers. A permissive char-
ter allows the state legislature to enact implementing legislation at its own discretion. Vanlanding-
ham, supra note 57, at 278.
60. In effect, home rule charters limit a state legislature's control over matters of purely local
concern. See People v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167 (1903); Big Rapids v. Michigan Consol. Gas
Co., 324 Mich. 358, 37 N.W.2d 136 (1949); City of Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St. 2d 62, 337
N.E.2d 766 (1975); City of West Allis v. Milwaukee, 39 Wis. 2d 356, 159 N.W.2d 36 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1064 (1969).
Definitions of a local matter are rarely, if ever, included in a home rule charter. The lack of
definition leaves delineation of the elements of a "local affair" to the state courts. See City of
Pueblo v. Kurtz, 66 Colo. 447, 182 P. 884 (1919); Denver v. Hallett, 34 Colo. 393, 83 P. 1066
(1905); State v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670 (1913).
See generally S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 217 (1970);
Bangasser, supra note 39, at vii, xxxii; Vanlandingham, supra note 57, at 280, Note, The Antitrust
Liability f Municoalties Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REV. 368, 382 (1977); Note, Anti-
trust Law and Munic67al Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt From Sherman Act Coverage
Under the Parker Doctrine 65 GEo. L.J. 1547, 1559 (1977).
61. The state legislature may enact statutes that supersede a home rule municipality's ordi-
nances if the statute concerns a matter that is a state affair and not a purely local concern. See
Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. for Poor Children, Inc. v. State Bd. of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 149-50,
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legislative dictates.62 Nonetheless, municipalities are not simply instru-
mentalities of the state because they have a general police power to
protect the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.6 3 Colo-
rado's home rule charter,64 although enacted as a constitutional provi-
sion, is not appreciably different from other home rule charters in the
degree of autonomy it grants to municipalities.65 Colorado home rule
is a delegated power because of its derivation from the state constitu-
tion.6 6
In Community Communications Company v City of Boulder67 the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that the city was
immune from antitrust liability because of its authority under the Colo-
220 P.2d 872, 874 (1950); Nugent v. City of East Providence, 103 R.I. 518, 524, 238 A.2d 758, 762
(1968).
A state statute also may supersede the ordinances of a home rule municipality if the statute
affects local affairs directed to a state concern. See Del Luca v. Town Adm'r of Methuen, 368
Mass. 1, 8, 329 N.E.2d 748, 755 (1974); City of Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St. 2d 62, 69, 337
N.E.2d 766, 771 (1975).
See generally Vanlandingham, supra note 57, at 280; Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Corpo-
rations: Are Municipalities Exempt From Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65
GEo. L.J. 1547, 1560 (1977).
62. See note 61 supra. See generally City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24
Iowa 455, 463 (1868); 1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MuNIciPAL CORPORATIONS,
§ 237 (5th ed. 1911); Vanlandingham, supra note 41.
63. See Kansas City v. Frogge, 352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1944).
64. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. The home rule charter, in pertinent part reads:
Section 6. Home rule for cities and towns. The people of each city or town of this
state, having a population of two thousand inhabitants as determined by the last preced-
ing census taken under the authority of the United States, the state of Colorado or said
city or town, are hereby vested with, and they shall always have, power to make, amend,
add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its organic law and
extend to all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall super-
sede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the
state in conflict therewith.
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of all municipalities
coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local and municipal
matters and the enumeration herein of certain powers shall not be construed to deny
such cities and towns, and to the people thereof, any right or power essential or proper to
the full exercise of such right.
The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to
such cities and towns, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such cities and
towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.
Id.
65. See note 61 supra.
66. See Service Oil Co. v. Rhodus, 179 Colo. 335, 500 P.2d 807 (1972); State Farm Mutual
Auto Ins. Co. v. Temple, 176 Colo. 537, 491 P.2d 1371 (1972).
67. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,362 (10th Cir.).
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rado home rule statute.68
Chief Judge Seth, writing for the majority, emphasized that the ordi-
nances regulating cable television 69 were not beyond the city's author-
ity.70 He found that state courts recognized a municipality's authority
to regulate local affairs. 71 Because plaintiffs' franchise only permitted
service to residents within the city limits of Boulder, 2 these ordinances
were a purely local affair.73
Chief Judge Seth then examined a municipality's authority under
Colorado's home rule charter.74 He acknowledged the trial court's con-
clusion that the people of Colorado are the ultimate source of govern-
mental powerY.7  He argued that because the people had grafted the
home rule provisions into the Colorado Constitution, home rule munic-
ipalities operate by the authority of the people.7 6 The city thus has
supreme authority over local matters because its authority is express.77
68. Id at 75,843.
69. See notes 5-6 supra.
70. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,362, at 75,841 (10th Cir.).
71. Id See Manor Vail Condominium Ass'n v. Town of Vail, - Colo. _, 604 P.2d 1168
(1980); Veterans of Foreign Wars, Port 4264 v. City of Steamboat Springs, 195 Colo. 44, 54, 575
P.2d 835, 840 (1978); Security Life & Accident Co. v. Temple, 177 Colo. 14, 16, 492 P.2d 63, 64
(1972); Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 149
Colo. 284, 294-95, 369 P.2d 67, 72 (1962); People v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo.
167, 173, 243 P.2d 397, 399 (1952). But see City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329
P.2d 441 (1958). In that case, the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
The United States Constitution provides for a national government with a federal sys-
tem of states. All powers not expressly granted the federal government are reserved to
the states or to thepeople. Colorado's Enabling Act, approved by the federal government
when we acquired statehood insured that our state will have a republican form of gov-
ernment. Clearly our federal system does not envisage as a part thereof city-states. It
therefore follows that home rule cities can be only an arm or branch of the state with
delegated power. That is the kind of power granted by Article XX.
Id at 48, 329 P.2d at 445 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
72. See note 4 supra.
73. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,362, at 75,842 (10th Cir.). Judge Seth also considered the
Supreme Court decision in TV Pix, Inc: v. Taylor, 396 U.S. 556 (1970) (per curiam). The Supreme
Court affirmed a lower court's opinion that held regulation of community antenna television sys-
tems within the state was the local business of the state. Chief Judge Seth found the situation in
City of Boulder comparable, even though TVPix dealt with state regulation of anticompetitive
activities. Judge Markey, dissenting, noted that the antitrust laws were nowhere mentioned in TV
Pix. He believed the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392
U.S. 157 (1968), which held that cable television is not a local matter, should control. [1980-2]
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,467, at 76,468 (10th Cir.) (Markey, J., dissenting).
74. See note 65 supra.
75. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,362, at 75,842 (10th Cir.).
76. Id
77. Id
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Furthermore, the City's authority to regulate an activity that the state
has failed to regulate is beyond dispute.78
Chief Judge Seth ruled, with only minimal discussion, that the City's
regulation of cable television was a governmental and not a proprietary
interest.79 By distinguishing City of Boulder from City of Lafayette, he
held that the municipality in City of Lafayette was exercising a proprie-
tary interest.80 Consequently, the City of Lafayette test does not apply
when a municipality acts in its governmental capacity.81 Chief Judge
Seth ruled that the Midcal Aluminum test is the appropriate standard
when a municipality regulates a governmental interest.82
Chief Judge Seth applied the Midcal Aluminum standard to City of
Boulder and found that the city was exempt from the antitrust laws.83
He stressed that the state had failed to express a policy on the regula-
tion of cable television. 84 He ruled that the language of the morato-
rium and model ordinances represented the city's policy and thus
fulfiled the first step of the Midcal Aluminum test.85 The ninety-day
moratorium reflected the supervision of the city's policy and fulfilled
the second step of the MidcalAluminum test.86
78. Id But see note 37 srupra and accompanying text.
79. [1980-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,362, at 75,842 (10th Cir.). See note 49 supra.




84. Id at 75,842.
85. Id at 75,843. See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text. But cf. In re Airport Car
Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (state grant of power to home rule
city to operate transportation system not authorization for anticompetitive regulation and monop-
olization); Woolen v. Surtan Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (state grant of
power to home rule city to operate airport not authorization for anticompetitive activities in oper-
ation of airport).
86. [1980-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,362, at 75,844 (10th Cir.). But see Bangasser, supra note
39, at vii. See also Norman's On The Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (3d
Cir. 1971) (Virgin Islands Alcoholic Beverages Fair Trade Law requiring filing by wholesalers and
other dealers of a minimum retail price list held insufficient to invoke state action immunity); Gas
Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062
(1972) (power company regulated by state Public Service Commission as to rates and services held
sufficient to invoke state action immunity); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1294-95 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (natural gas
producers regulation by Texas Railroad Commission, where producers had filed false forecasts
with an anticompetitive effect, held insufficient to invoke state action immunity); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966) (state statutory program
regulating rates and standards of insurance companies, established, and supervised by state held
sufficient to invoke state action immunity); Marnell v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 260 F.
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Judge Markey, in a lengthy dissent,87 criticized the majority's inter-
pretation of the state action exemption. He emphasized that the Parker
Court narrowly limited the exemption to state legislative action.88 He
strenuously objected to the treatment of municipalities as states or as
sovereign within their borders.8 9 He argued that City of Lafayette con-
trolled and should foreclose immunity for the city.90
The City of Boulder court's effort to formulate a special test for as-
sessing antitrust liability when a city asserts a governmental interest is
commendable. Numerous policy arguments, however, including the
devastating effect on a municipality of a treble damage judgment,
weigh heavily in favor of exempting municipalities from the antitrust
laws.9' Nonetheless, the majority opinion in City of Boulder is ques-
tionable on two grounds-the court's analysis of home rule powers and
its application of the principles of federalism.92
First, the City of Boulder court overstates the authority of a home
rule municipality. Home rule charters do not equate a municipality
with a state.93 Municipalities are agents of the state and, therefore, are
Supp. 391, 409-10 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (state authorization of Public Utilities Commission to change
rates and contracts of retail parcel delivery companies held insufficient to invoke state action im-
munity).
87. [1980-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,467, at 76, 464-70 (10th Cir.) (Markey, J., dissenting).
88. Id at 76,466 (Markey, J., dissenting).
89. Id at 76,467 (Markey, J., dissenting). Judge Markey placed great reliance on City &
County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958). See note 71 supra.
90. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) % 63,467, at 76,467 (10th Cir.) (Markey, J., dissenting).
91. Subjecting municipalities to the threat of a treble damage judgment would have a chilling
effect on services provided by the municipality. See Note, Munic4palAntitrust Liability. Appling
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 563 (1979), Comment,
Antitrust Law and Municpal Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt From Sherman Act Coverage
Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547 (1977).
In addition, denial of municipal immunity may result in municipalities being joined in every
antitrust action involving private parties. See Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations:
Are Municpalities Exempt From Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 Gao. L.J.
1547 (1977). Cf. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 616 n.4 (1976) (the holding in Parker
would lose all meaning if private parties were allowed to avoid liability by joining the municipal-
ity).
92. The City of Boulder decision is also open to question on its use of the Midcal.4luminunt
test. The Court in MidcalAluminum did not formulate a new standard. It affirmed criteria that
had evolved from the Parker doctrine to the fairly narrow test in City of Lafayette. The Mldcal
Aluminum test was initially stated in Bates and affirmed in City of Lafayette. The MldcalAluml.
num criteria are implicit to the City of Lafayette standard and, therefore, do not constitute a
separate test. Consequently the City of Boulder court's rejection of the City of Lafayette standard
has no basis in fact.
93. See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text.
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subordinate to the state.94 Home rule charters expressly limit munici-
palities to exercise of control over local matters. 95 Moreover, even in
areas of purely local concern, municipalities are not completely auton-
omous.9 6 Municipal regulations that conflict with general statutes of
the state are invalid.9 7 In addition, home rule charters do not deprive
the state legislature of power to declare public policy.9 8 The Mideal
Aluminum test explicitly requires state, not municipal, policy and su-
pervision.99 If the state fails to express an opinion about an alleged
anticompetitive activity, the state's policy is neutral. l°° A municipality
cannot then assume the position of the state and regulate local affairs in
an anticompetitive manner.
Second, the City of Boulder court's ruling on the authority of the city
demonstrates a failure to appreciate the distribution of authority in the
federal system.' 0 ' Under the Constitution the federal system is a dual
system of government comprised exclusively of states and the federal
government.10 2 The Constitution nowhere extends recognition to mu-
nicipalities. Within the federal system, both states and the federal gov-
ernment are sovereign.'0 3 Municipalities are not sovereign and, thus,
cannot occupy the same position as states in the federal system.104 Mu-
nicipalities exist at the will of state legislatures. 105 Home rule charters,
including Colorado's, allow municipal ordinances to supersede state
law under certain circumstances." °  The Parker Court made clear,
10 7
94. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
95. See note 61 supra.
96. See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text.
97. See note 61 supra. See also Bennion v. City & County of Denver, 180 Colo. 213, 215, 504
P.2d 350, 351 (1972); Vela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 466, 484 P.2d 1204, 1205 (1971); Vick v.
People, 166 Colo. 565, 566-67, 445 P.2d 220, 221 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 945 (1969); Horst v.
City & County of Denver, 101 Colo. 284, 73 P.2d 388 (1937).
98. See Stokes v. Newton, 106 Colo. 61, 101 P.2d 21 (1940); People v. City & County of
Denver, 90 Colo. 598, 603, 10 P.2d 1106, 1108 (1932).
99. See note 92 supra.
I00. See notes 43-48 supra and accompanying text.
101. See note 39 supra.
102. See note 39 supra. See also S. HOLLOWAY, INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 8 (1972).
103. See note 25 supra.
104. See note 25 supra.
105. See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
106. See Vela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 484 P.2d 1204 (1971); Zelinger v. Public Sewer Co.,
164 Colo. 424,435 P.2d 412 (1967); City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41,329 P.2d 441
(1958); Horst v. City & County of Denver, 101 Colo. 284, 73 P.2d 388 (1937).
107. See note 26 supra.
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however, that home rule charters cannot vest municipalities with au-
thority to enact laws that violate valid congressional acts such as the
Sherman Act." 8 The state cannot grant power it does not possess.
Thus, if the state does not qualify for the state action exemption, a mu-
nicipality cannot automatically qualify for immunity simply because of
its status as a home rule municipality.
City of Boulder, therefore, despite the court's efforts to add clarity to
the state action exemption, provides little guidance for courts that seek
to judge a municipality's claim of immunity from the antitrust laws.
108. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, provides in pertinent part: "This Constitution, and the laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the Supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389, 430-31 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting). But see National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976). In City of Lafayette Justice Stewart, in dissent, stated that Nationa/League of
Cities held that both states and their instrumentalities must receive equal deference with regard to
services traditionally provided by the state. The plurality in City of Lafayette disagreed. Justice
Brenan stated that nothing in National League of Cities suggested "a constructional principle of
presumptive congressional deference in behalf of cities." Id. at 412-13 n.42 (1977).
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